The Dominion Election Security Scandal
New Right Report Editorial | November 1, 2026
For years, Mike Lindell has been sounding the alarm about computerized voting systems. He's been mocked, sued, and dismissed as a conspiracy theorist.
Meanwhile, cybersecurity researchers have uncovered serious vulnerabilities in Dominion voting equipment, including weaknesses that could allow attackers to interfere with how votes are recorded.
The latest findings deserve national attention.
In Puerto Rico, researchers examining Dominion equipment identified serious software vulnerabilities. Their findings included weaknesses that could potentially expose election systems to unauthorized access and manipulation.
And this is hardly an isolated case.
In 2022, the federal Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency identified nine vulnerabilities affecting versions of Dominion's ImageCast X voting system.
A year later, University of Michigan researchers demonstrated how malicious software could potentially compromise ballot-marking devices. One vulnerability could allow malware to spread from a county's central election-management computer to voting devices throughout the jurisdiction.
Researchers also identified weaknesses in authentication cards, USB access, and system protections.
Georgia has faced additional security concerns, including a vulnerability that could expose how individual citizens voted.
These findings reveal a troubling reality. Equipment responsible for recording Americans' votes has contained serious security weaknesses, and some have remained unresolved long after researchers identified them.
The consequences of an insecure election system are enormous.
A compromised election could determine who controls Congress, occupies the White House, appoints federal judges, or directs billions in taxpayer spending. In a close race, a relatively small number of altered votes could change the outcome.
And if a voting system lacks reliable independent verification, detecting and proving that manipulation occurred could be extraordinarily difficult.
That possibility alone should concern every American, regardless of political affiliation.
Yet much of the public debate has focused on the personalities questioning election technology, while the underlying vulnerabilities deserve far more scrutiny.
Lindell has been one of the most persistent voices in that debate.
In June 2026, his Election Crime Bureau published a 799-page report cataloging 828 alleged election-integrity findings, including concerns involving election-management systems, audit records, and security procedures.
The same month, Dominion ended its $1.3 billion defamation lawsuit against him through a confidential settlement.
The allegations in Lindell's report require independent verification. Federal cybersecurity investigations have documented exploitable weaknesses in Dominion equipment, but have not established that those weaknesses were used to manipulate election results.
The issue is bigger than Dominion.
Americans are being asked to place extraordinary trust in a complicated network of private technology vendors, government certification authorities, election administrators, and software systems.
When vulnerabilities are discovered, the public deserves to know whether they were corrected, whether the equipment remains secure, and whether independent audits can reliably verify the results.
Those answers should be readily available. They should not require years of litigation, technical investigations, or pressure from outside researchers.
Because the consequences extend well beyond a single election.
If an insecure system were successfully manipulated, the result could place political power in the hands of candidates voters did not elect. The policies enacted by those officials, the judges they appoint, and the decisions they make could shape the country for decades.
Even without a successful attack, unresolved vulnerabilities and inadequate verification can destroy confidence in legitimate results.
That is a dangerous position for any republic.
America has the technology and expertise to conduct secure, independently verifiable elections. There is no acceptable reason to leave known vulnerabilities unresolved or to resist meaningful public scrutiny.
The people running our elections have an obligation to demonstrate that the systems work, that votes are accurately counted, and that the results can be independently verified.
Until they do, the questions surrounding computerized voting are not going away.
Nor should they.
